Existence of balanced points.
A formulation of a fixed point theorem, which can be applied conveniently to non-cooperative games and cooperative games, is suggested in this note.
Let iVi, . . . , N m be m non-empty, finite disjoint sets. For k = 1, . . . , m we denote by S k the simplex the coordinates of whose points are indexed by the members of N k \ thus S k is the collection of all real functions x k defined on N k which satisfy: By Brouwer's fixed point theorem/ has a fixed point. The proof now follows from (1.11) and (1.13).
We are now able to generalize a result of Knaster, Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz. ) G S = Si X ... X S n is an w-tuple of mixed strategies and y k G S k , then we define:
x G S is an equilibrium point if
Let iVi, . . . , N n be the sets of pure strategies of the players 1, . . . , n respectively. For x G S and i, j G N k , 1 < k < w, we define
Interpretation. Player k "prefers" his pure strategy i to j, when x is played, if (a) i is better than j against the strategies x 1 , . . . , x Aw , x* +1 , . . . , x w , and (b) he uses j with positive probability in x fc . It is a straightforward matter to show that Nash's equilibrium points are exactly the balanced points of S, and that the results of the previous section can be applied to yield the existence of balanced points in S. (N, v) be a cooperative game; here N = {1, . . . , n) is the set of players of G, and v is the characteristic function. We assume that v satisfies:
The kernel of a cooperative game (1). Let G =
An outcome of G is a pair (x; /3), where /3 = {£i, . . . , B m } is a partition of the set of players, and x = (x 3 , . . . , x n ) is a payoff distribution to the players, which satisfies: (2.5) Xi > 0, for i = 1, . . . , n ; (2.6) Z*€*y *< = »(5y), forj = 1, . . . , W.
Let /3 be a partition of iV. We set, (2.7) X(P) = {x| (x, p) is an outcome for G}. By definition x is balanced (according to our definition) if and only if it belongs to the kernel of G (for the partition f3 of the players). It is proved in (1) that the relations defined in (2.9) are transitive; since (1.4) and (1.5) are obvious in this case, the non-emptiness of the kernel follows from the theorem in the first section (with obvious modifications).
We remark that our results can also be applied to yield a direct existence proof for the bargaining set Mi {i) (2; 4).
